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1 Competition Between Reasons 
One of the most important facts about the normative domain is that some considerations are 
contributory, rather than decisive, when it comes to determining what we ought to, must, or 
may do.1 They provide defeasible support or defeasible opposition to an option. In 
epistemology, the theory of practical reasoning, and ethics, it is standard to appeal to 
contributory or pro tanto normative reasons to capture this fact. Most of our options have some 
reasons in favor and some reasons against; to determine which option to take, we have to 
determine how these reasons compare. In particular, on the standard view reasons compete 
with one another, and the outcome of this competition determines what you ought to, must, or 
may do.2 That action 𝐴 would be mildly pleasant is a reason to do 𝐴, and that an incompatible 
action 𝐵 would prevent a great deal of suffering is a reason to do 𝐵. These reasons compete 
with one another, since 𝐴 and 𝐵 are incompatible. If there are no other relevant reasons, then 
what you ought to, must, or may do—A or B—will depend on the outcome of this competition. 
An important task for normative theory, then, is to explain how the competition between 
reasons works. A large part of this task will involve investigating relationships of defeat 
between reasons, since when reasons compete, at least in many cases, some reasons will defeat 
others—that is how they win the competition. Though the concept of defeat is perhaps more 
familiar in epistemology, I will be concerned mostly with the practical domain. 
																																																								
* Thanks to Mona Simion, Kurt Sylvan, Jonathan Way, and audiences at the University of Buffalo, 
Colgate University, and Vanderbilt University.  
1 See Ross (1930) for an early and very influential development of this idea; for a recent overview, see 
Lord and Maguire (2016). 
2 I’m using this slightly long-winded phrase, ‘what you ought to, must, or may do’, because the 
differences between these different normative statuses will be important later. To note the difference 
between ‘ought’ and ‘must’ here, consider the following, which may be said about some supererogatory 
action: “Well, no, I’m not saying you must do it, but you really ought to”. 
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Following Pollock (1974), epistemologists have focused primarily on two distinct kinds of 
defeat: rebutting defeat and undercutting defeat. One reason rebuts another when it is a 
stronger reason for a conflicting option. In the case above, for example, it is plausible that the 
reason for B, that it would prevent a lot of suffering, rebuts the reason for the conflicting 
option A, that it would be mildly pleasant. Importantly, in cases of (mere) rebutting, the 
defeated reason is in an important sense still “in force”. It isn’t that there is no reason for A in 
this case; after all, it would be mildly pleasant. It’s just that this reason is (rebuttingly) 
defeated, or outweighed. If these are the only reasons in play, then it’s very plausible at least 
that you ought to do B, and perhaps that you must or are required to do B, in which case it’s 
not true that you may do A, or that A is permissible. 
One reason undercuts another, on the other hand, when the first does undermine the second’s 
status as a reason—to use a common metaphor, it attacks the connection between the 
consideration and the option it would otherwise support. That you promised to buy me lunch 
is, or would be, a reason to do so. But that the promise was coerced or given under duress 
plausibly undercuts this reason, so that in fact it is no reason at all to buy me lunch. So the 
first important difference between cases of rebutting and cases of undercutting is that in the 
former, but not the latter, the defeated reason is still in force.3 The second important difference 
is that in cases of undercutting, unlike in cases of rebutting, the defeating reason need not, and 
typically will not, be a reason for a conflicting option. Note that the fact that your promise was 
coerced need not be a reason against buying me lunch, or a reason to do anything incompatible 
with buying me lunch, even though it does defeat—in an undercutting way—the promissory 
reason you would otherwise have to buy me lunch. 
A third way in which reasons compete, at least in the practical domain, is captured in Raz’s 
(1999) notion of an exclusionary reason. There is some debate about the best way to understand 
exclusionary reasons, but on a natural understanding, one reason excludes another when the 
first is a reason to take the second out of consideration. To borrow Raz’s example, suppose I 
promise my partner that my decision about where to send our daughter to school will be 
guided entirely by the quality of the education she would get. In that case, that Fancy Private 
School is more expensive than Good Public School just isn’t something I should take into 
account in deciding where to send her. It may seem that my promise is an undercutting 
defeater of the financial reason to send our daughter to Good Public School. But in fact there is 
an important difference between undercutters, as in the coerced promise case above, and 
exclusionary reasons.4 In the undercutting case, the initial reason is no longer in force at all—it 																																																								
3 In fact this is too simple. There are cases of partial undercutting in which a reason is not fully undercut, 
but just weakened. So a bit more precisely: when a reason is merely rebutted, it retains its full strength, 
but when it is undercut, it loses at least some—and perhaps all—of its strength. See Schroeder (2007), 
Chapter 5; compare Dancy (2004), Chapter 3, on attenuators. 
4 See Horty (2012) and Horty and Nair (fc) for the claim that exclusionary reasons are just undercutters. 
See Raz (1999), p. 184 and Whiting (2017), p. 400, for a rejection of this identification. 
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is just not a reason anymore. But in the exclusionary case, the reason is in force, it’s just that I 
have a reason not to take it into account in my deliberation.5 In the undercutting case, there is 
no reason to be taken into account. Nevertheless, even though the reason in the exclusionary 
case is in force, it will lose the competition—in fact, since it is taken out of consideration, it 
doesn’t even get to compete.6 
So we have seen three different ways in which a reason may be defeated, or in which reasons 
can compete. The reason may be rebutted, undercut, or excluded. Arguably, the most 
straightforward of these is rebutting defeat, in which a reason is defeated by a stronger reason 
for a conflicting option. One goal for this paper is to suggest that rebutting defeat is actually 
not as straightforward as it seems. In particular, I will argue that we should recognize two 
different varieties of rebutting defeat. First, there are cases in which a reason for one option is 
defeated by a stronger reason for an incompatible option. Second, there are cases in which a 
reason for one option is defeated by a stronger reason against that same option (or vice versa). 
Many philosophers have not recognized this distinction between two kinds of rebutting defeat, 
I believe, because they have not recognized a distinction between reasons for and reasons 
against. It is a common, though usually implicit, assumption that reasons against an option are 
just reasons for incompatible alternatives. I argue in Snedegar (2018) that this is a mistake. In 
this paper, I explore the consequences of recognizing the distinction between reasons for and 
reasons against for accounts of how reasons compete, focusing on rebutting defeat. The overall 
goal is to make some progress in understanding how the competition between pro tanto reasons 
determines the overall status of our options.  
First I’ll introduce what I take to be the most common way of thinking about the competition 
between reasons, which I call balance accounts. Then I’ll argue this picture—as so far 
developed—is inadequate, primarily because it does not recognize the importance of reasons 
against. I then consider a very different way of thinking about the competition between 
reasons, which I call criticism-based accounts. This kind of view does recognize the importance 
of reasons against, but misses out on the importance of the competition between reasons 
bearing on competing options. Finally, I sketch a positive view that incorporates elements of 
both kinds of view. Open questions remain, but I argue that it gives us the beginnings of an 
attractive account of how the competition between reasons determines the overall status of our 
options. 
																																																								
5 Whiting (2017) makes essentially the same point, but he understands exclusionary reasons as second-
order reasons not to base one’s actions or attitudes (including decisions) on certain ordinary, first-order 
reasons. Raz (1999), especially in the postscript, often seems to understand them in this way, as well.  
6 I am glossing over some complications here. For example, there may be cases in which the excluded 
reason is so weighty that it should not be excluded. A full theory of the competition between reasons, 
and in particular of how exclusionary reasons function, will need to explain this. 
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2 Balance Accounts 
According to balance accounts, reasons compete by weighing against each other in a way that’s 
broadly analogous to how physical objects on a scale compete to let us see which is the 
heaviest.7 In fact, discussions of competing reasons often use a scale as a metaphor.8 The 
reasons are like differently weighted marbles that go on the pans of a scale, which correspond 
to the conflicting options. The pan with the most weight in it once all the reasons have been 
taken into account corresponds to the option you are required to perform. Asking what there is 
‘most reason’ to do is naturally understood as asking about the total amount of support 
provided by the individual reasons for each of the options, which involves the accrual of these 
reasons.9 This is probably the most common picture of the competition between reasons; it is 
suggested by the platitudinous claim that you are required to do what you have most reason to 
do.10 This gives us the most natural version of the balance account:11 
Balance: You are required to A when the reasons for A outweigh the reasons for any of 
the alternatives. 
The intuitive thought here is that if you have more reason for A than for anything else, then 
you are required to A. On this view, we imagine the deliberating agent facing a range of 
alternatives. Each alternative will have some reasons in its favor. We weigh these up and find 
out where the balance of reasons lies; that is the option the agent is required to take. This 
picture relies heavily on rebutting defeat, of course: the reasons for incompatible options 
compete, and the weightier ones rebut the less weighty ones.12 
This is a very natural picture, but as so far described, it faces problems. Suppose that pressing 
either button 1 or button 2 will guarantee that I get a particular $100 bill. But while pressing 
button 1 has no cost, pressing button 2 will deliver a painful electrical shock. Assuming these 
are the only relevant factors in this case, it is clear that I am required to press button 1 and that 																																																								
7 A different metaphor comes from Ross (1930), who thinks of the competition between pro tanto 
considerations as analogous to the competition between different forces acting on an object. I take the 
two physical metaphors to suggest the very similar conceptions of the competition between reasons. 
8 See, e.g., Broome (2004).  
9 On accrual, see Nair (2016). 
10 Often authors use ‘ought’ instead of ‘required’ here. I think that most of them have in mind what I’ll 
mean by ‘required’, including that you’d be acting impermissibly by not doing what you “ought” (in 
their sense) to do. In any case, this won’t matter much for my discussion of the Balance Account, though 
the difference between these overall normative statuses will become important later.  
11 Compare Parfit (2011), p. 32, Schroeder (2015), and Lord (2018), p. 10-11. 
12 The picture will be more sophisticated than this, to accommodate undercutting defeat, as well as what 
Dancy (2004) calls enablers, disablers, intensifiers, and attenuators, at least. 
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I am required not to press button 2. But note that in this case, my reason for pressing button 1 
is the same as my reason for pressing button 2—doing so will get me $100. So I do not have 
more reason for pressing button 1 than for pressing button 2, and so, according to Balance, it 
isn’t true that I am required to press button 1. What we need, clearly, is to add reasons against: 
there is a reason against pressing button 2—the electrical shock—that is not a reason against 
pressing button 1, and this explains why pressing 1 is required and why pressing 2 is 
impermissible. 
This problem may seem fairly obvious, and so you may worry that I’ve been unfair to defenders 
of balance accounts. The reason this problem hasn’t been apparent, I believe, is that defenders 
have (in most cases, implicitly) made the assumption mentioned in the introduction, that 
reasons against an option are just reasons for alternatives to that option. If this were true, then 
Balance would take reasons against into account, since reasons against just are reasons for 
alternatives. The obvious thought in this case is that if we understand the fact that pressing 
button 2 would give you a shock as a reason for the alternative to pressing 2—that is, pressing 
1—then we get an extra reason for pressing 1, and so that is what you are required to do.  
An alternative, defended by Schroeder (2007), can also avoid this problem. This is because 
Schroeder understands the relevant kind of competition to be the competition between reasons 
for an option and reasons against that option. However, Schroeder makes exactly this kind of 
assumption about reasons against: he assumes that reasons against an option are simply 
reasons for not performing that option.13 So his version of the balance account is not so 
different from Balance, after all; it’s just Balance with a particular conception of what the 
alternatives to A are—namely, not doing A. The important thing is that both focus just on the 
competition between reasons for incompatible options. 
In fact it is important that Schroeder does make this assumption, because otherwise his 
account faces a similar problem. Suppose that in the case above, the electrical shock that I will 
receive if I press button 2 is mild enough that I would be happy to endure it to receive $100. 
That is, the reason against pressing button 2 is weaker than the reason for pressing button 2. So 
according to Schroeder’s view, it looks like I am required to press button 2, which is false. But 
if reasons against an option are simply reasons for not performing that option, we may be able 
to avoid this problem. In particular, if we can assume that the reason for pressing button 1—
that it will get me $100—is a reason for not pressing button 2—that is, given Schroeder’s 
assumption, a reason against pressing button 2—then we can avoid the result that I am 
required to press button 2.14 
So the assumption that reasons against are simply reasons for alternatives helps different 
versions of the balance account avoid problems. Moreover, this assumption is a very natural 																																																								
13 See Schroeder (2015) for relevant discussion, and Nagel (1970), p. 47, for the same assumption. 
14 See Pendlebury (ms), who also makes this observation. 
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one to come to if you begin with the balancing metaphor, and then want to accommodate 
reasons against. We know how to think about reasons for on this picture: they’re like marbles 
that go into the relevant pan. It isn’t immediately obvious how to build in reasons against, on 
the other hand. But if these are just reasons for alternatives, then we know how to 
accommodate them. Less metaphorically, this assumption will simplify our theory of the 
competition between reasons, since we only have to understand one kind of rebutting defeat: 
the kind that holds between reasons for incompatible options. But as I argue in the next 
section, the assumption that reasons against an option are simply reasons for alternatives to 
that option is false. So we cannot appeal to this assumption to defend the balancing account. 
3 Reasons For and Reasons Against 
I will begin by introducing a paradigmatic example of a reason against. This is borrowed from 
Greenspan (2005), who also argues (in a different way) for a sharp distinction between reasons 
for and reasons against. Then I will consider various ways of trying to reduce this reason 
against the option to a reason for alternatives, and argue that none are satisfactory.15 This will 
support the claim that the reason against relation is distinct from the reason for relation, and 
thus the claim that our theory of the competition between reasons should account for both the 
competition between reasons for competing options and the competition between reasons for 
an option and reasons against that same option. 
Suppose that I am trying to decide which shirt to wear: the blue one, the red one, or the green 
one. The blue shirt is boring. This fact is clearly relevant to the choice at hand. This is because 
it’s a reason against wearing the blue shirt. On the view that reasons against are simply reasons 
for alternatives, its being a reason against wearing the blue shirt must amount to its being a 
reason for alternatives to wearing the blue shirt. The important question, then, is: which of the 
alternatives? 
Perhaps the most natural answer—which has been endorsed by Nagel (1970) and, as we saw in 
the previous section, Schroeder (2007)—is that reasons against an action are just reasons for 
not performing that action. So to say that the fact that the blue shirt is boring is a reason 
against wearing the blue shirt is just to say that this fact is a reason for not wearing the blue 
shirt. I believe that this answer is plausible when we think about the choice the agent is facing 
as a choice about whether to wear the blue shirt—that is, a choice between wearing the blue 
shirt and not wearing the blue shirt. But in this case, the choice is more fine-grained than this: 
it is a choice between wearing the blue shirt, wearing the red shirt, and wearing the green 
shirt. Reasons against wearing the blue shirt, like the fact that it is boring, are clearly relevant 
for this choice, and not only the more coarse-grained choice between wearing the blue shirt 
and not wearing it, since they count against wearing the blue shirt. But as so far stated, the 
view in question doesn’t really tell us how it bears on this choice. It must count against wearing 																																																								
15 See Snedegar (2018) for more detailed versions of these arguments. 
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the blue shirt by counting in favor of some alternative option(s). But not wearing the blue shirt 
is not one of the options. The same kind of objection would apply to the view that a reason 
against wearing the blue shirt is just a reason for the disjunction of the alternatives, since the 
disjunction of the alternatives is not one of the options, either.16  
A second initially plausible answer is that the fact that the blue shirt is boring is a reason for 
each of the alternatives. Just as a reason for an option is or indicates something positive (in 
some sense) about that option, a reason against an option is or indicates something negative 
about that option—something we’d like to avoid if possible. Wearing the red shirt would let 
me avoid what’s bad about wearing the blue shirt, namely its boringness. So would wearing the 
green shirt. But this view is false. Suppose that the green shirt is even more boring than the 
blue shirt. Then the fact that the blue shirt is boring—though it is a reason against wearing the 
blue shirt—is not a reason for wearing the green shirt. So reasons against an option are not 
simply reasons for each of the alternatives. Moreover, this case shows that even the weaker 
claim that each reason against an option is also a reason for each of the alternatives (though 
reasons against may not be reducible to reasons for alternatives) is also false.17 
A third answer is that what it is to be a reason against an option is to be a reason for some 
alternative to that option. The fact that the blue shirt is boring is a reason against wearing the 
blue shirt. On this third view, this means that this fact is a reason for some alternative to 
wearing the blue shirt. The two alternatives are wearing the red shirt and wearing the green 
shirt. Plausibly a reason for wearing the red shirt—that it’s very comfortable—is a reason 
against wearing the blue shirt, if the blue shirt is not as comfortable. But the fact that the blue 
shirt is boring doesn’t seem to be a reason for any particular alternative to wearing the blue 
shirt. If we suppose that the green shirt is even more boring than the blue one, as above, then 
it is clearly not a reason for wearing the green one. Maybe it is a reason for wearing the red 
one, but the view in question seems to get the direction of explanation backwards: it isn’t that 
it’s a reason against wearing the blue shirt because it’s a reason for wearing the red one, or that 
its being a reason against wearing the blue one just amounts to its being a reason for wearing the 
red one. Rather, it’s a reason for wearing the red one—if it is—because it’s a reason against 
wearing the blue one.18 																																																								
16 Appealing to a kind of transmission principle, according to which a reason for not doing 𝐴, or for doing 
the disjunction of alternatives to 𝐴, bears on the choice at hand by being a reason for each way of not 
doing 𝐴, or of doing the disjunction, makes the view equivalent to the view I discuss in the next 
paragraph.  
17 This brings out further objection to the view that reasons against A are reasons for the disjunction of 
alternatives to A. Some of the alternatives to A may be even worse than A in the relevant respect (i.e. the 
respect which explains the reason against). If so, then doing that alternative is not plausibly a way of 
complying with the reason against doing A, but the view that reasons against are just reasons for the 
disjunction of alternatives seems to imply that it is, since it is a way of doing that disjunction. 
18 Compare Greenspan (2005) here. 
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So none of these three natural versions of the idea that reasons against an option just are 
reasons for alternatives to that option seem promising. We could offer more complicated 
answers, for example, that reasons against an option are reasons for disjunctions of only some 
of the alternatives (e.g., leaving out the alternatives that are even worse along the relevant 
dimension). But answers like this will not be very systematic, and if reasons against an option 
are to be identified with or reduced to reasons for alternatives, we might have hoped for a more 
systematic account. I think we do better to allow for the existence of reasons against options 
that are not just reasons for any of the alternatives to that option. These reasons against will 
bear on choices involving the option. There can also be reasons against an option that are not 
reasons for alternatives that are even worse along the relevant dimension. Finally, we do not 
need to find any particular alternative that the reasons against one option are reasons for, in 
order for them to factor into the competition. 
It is also good to step back and think about why we were trying to do without a distinct 
category of reasons against in the first place. It is indeed hard to see how a reason could count 
against an option other than by counting in favor of alternatives to that option if we remain 
wedded to the balancing metaphor. But it’s well known that this metaphor is oversimplified. 
Once we move past that, there seems to be no special problem with reasons against: if we can 
understand the idea that a reason for an option counts in favor of it, there should be no special 
obstacle to understanding how a reason could count against an option. Nevertheless, as I said 
above, this does mean that our theory of the competition between reasons will need to 
recognize at least two kinds of rebutting defeat or outweighing: that between reasons for 
conflicting options, and that between reasons for an option and reasons against that same 
option. In the next section I consider whether a different account of the competition between 
reasons that incorporates a distinction between reasons for and reasons against might be more 
successful. 
4 Criticism-based Accounts 
I call the kind of view I consider in this section a criticism-based account. Both Greenspan (2005, 
2007) and Gert (2003, 2004, 2007, 2016) defend views of this sort. As I’ll explain briefly 
below, the version I describe here is closer to Greenspan’s version, but I take the most 
important part of the view (for my purposes) to be common between Greenspan and Gert. 
According to criticism-based accounts, the conception of reasons and rationality lying behind 
the balancing account of stacking up reasons for various options and weighing them against 
each other is mistaken. Instead, as Greenspan says, reasons are “invoked primarily to offer or 
answer criticism of action”, and rationality is not about doing what your reasons most strongly 
support, but rather “avoiding being subject to significant criticism or having a response to it 
available”.19 																																																								
19 Greenspan (2005), p. 389. 
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Note that there are two importantly distinct functions of reasons here, and correspondingly 
two distinct ways of acting rationally. First, reasons might offer, or ground, criticism of an 
option. Second, reasons might answer such criticism. You can act rationally either by not acting 
in ways for which you could be criticized (or “significantly” criticized), or by having an 
adequate response to such criticism. This contrasts with the balance account, which 
understand reasons to have a single underlying function, that of counting in favor of options. 
Since one part of the challenge for balance accounts was to explain two different ways in which 
reasons could compete, the criticism-based account seems to be an improvement. In particular, 
the criticism-based account includes a distinct role for reasons against—that of grounding (or 
perhaps just serving as) criticisms. 
The competition between reasons, on this view, works as follows. Reasons against an option 
tend to rule it out as a permissible option—thus, they tend to generate requirements not to act 
in that way. Reasons for an option, on the other hand, can help justify you in performing the 
option even in the face of the reasons against it. For example, that you risk being killed by 
running into the street is a reason against doing so; it would typically be sufficient to generate 
a requirement not to do this. But if there is a child stranded in the street, that is a reason for 
running into the street that can plausibly justify you in doing so, even in the face of the 
requiring reason not to.20 That you risk being killed by running into the street is a criticism of 
doing so; that the child is stranded there answers this criticism, making running into the street 
rationally permissible. From a moral perspective, things are reversed: the fact that the child is 
stranded in the street counts against staying on the sidewalk, and would make it 
impermissible. But you have a reason for staying on the sidewalk, namely that there are cars 
hurtling past, that can morally justify you in staying on the sidewalk.  
So far this seems compatible with the balance account, since we could just understand all of 
this in terms of the weights of the reasons involved.21 What is distinctive of this view, for the 
purposes of this paper, is the insistence that reasons against an option cannot be understood as 
reasons for alternatives to the option (including reasons for not performing the option). The 
central notion of criticism gives us a basis for a substantive distinction by understanding reasons 
against an option as grounding criticisms of the option, and reasons for as answering those 
criticisms. To criticize one option is not necessarily to answer a criticism of another option. 
That the blue shirt is boring does not necessarily answer any criticism of wearing the red shirt. 
In fact, it’s plausible that criticizing one option does not even necessarily provide any support 
for alternatives. At the very least, we can understand the arguments against identifying reasons 
against with reasons for as showing that it is far from straightforward to identify which 
alternative a criticism of a given option would support, in a way that both gives plausible 																																																								
20 I take this example from Gert (2007), p. 538. 
21 In fact one of both Greenspan’s and Gert’s main points is that we cannot properly handle these kinds 
of cases just by appealing to some single notion of weight. In particular, we can’t explain why you are 
permitted to run into the street but not required to do so. 
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results (by not falsely claiming that a criticism of A supports B when B is subject to the same 
kind of criticism, for example) and explains how reasons for and against can play the 
appropriate role in deliberation (by explaining how they actually bear on the options under 
consideration). In addition, answering a criticism of one option is not the same as criticizing an 
alternative option, so reasons for alternatives to A cannot just be reasons against A.22 For 
example, that I like the way the blue shirt fits may answer the criticism that it’s boring, but it 
does not necessarily amount to any criticism of the alternatives. This means that the opposite 
kind of reduction to that suggested on behalf of the balancing account—reducing reasons for 
alternatives to A to reasons against A, instead of reducing reasons against A to reasons for 
alternatives to A—won’t work, either. Thus, on this view, we have a sharp distinction between 
reasons for and reasons against. 
Gert (2004, 2007) focuses on a distinction between the requiring and justifying strengths of 
reasons. The mechanics of the competition between reasons are similar to that sketched above: 
justifying reasons (or reasons with justifying strength) are used to justify you in performing 
options that you would otherwise be required not to perform, due to the requiring reasons 
against them. Gert’s examples often involve reasons against options with requiring strength 
and reasons for those options with justifying strength. For example, he holds that in the case 
above involving the child stranded in the street, the fact that the child is stranded in the street 
has significant justifying strength in favor of running into the street—enough to justify you in 
doing so even in the face of the strong requiring reason against doing so, but no requiring 
strength, since it cannot generate a rational requirement to run into the street (whether it can 
generate moral requirements is a different question). But in fact the distinction between 
requiring and justifying and that between reasons for and against are cross-cutting. 
Nevertheless, on Gert’s view the primary competition between reasons is always between 
reasons for an option and reasons against that same option, where the two kinds of reasons are 
playing importantly different roles. It’s just that sometimes, for Gert, the reasons for play the 
requiring role while reasons against play the justifying role, and sometimes the reverse is true. 
Thus, in focusing on the competition between reasons for an option and reasons against it, 
Gert’s view is relevantly similar to the one sketched in this section, which is most directly 
based on Greenspan (2005, 2007). 
The criticism-based view, understood in terms of reasons for and reasons against, gives a 
plausible account of the competition between reasons for an option and reasons against it. 
When the reasons against an option win out, you are required not to perform that option. 
When the reasons for an option win out, you are permitted to perform it. Both Gert and 
Greenspan emphasize that this is the most we can say here: we cannot go on to say that you 																																																								
22 Though of course sometimes it can, in a sense. Kurt Sylvan (p.c.) suggests that some criticisms of one 
option, A, might be so serious that they suffice to answer or at least ignore criticisms of the alternative, 
B. But here it is more natural to say that the reason for B, or the answer to the criticisms B, are that you 
can avoid A, or maybe just that the (only) alternative is so terrible. If so then the reason for B is not 
identical with but rather derivative of the reason against A.  
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are required to perform the option, just because the reasons for the option win out over the 
reasons against it. This is because both reject a maximizing conception of rationality. All that 
rationality requires is not acting as you have overriding reason against acting, or avoiding 
unanswered criticism. So your reasons will generate a requirement for a particular action only 
by ruling out all of the alternatives: an option is required if and only if all of the alternatives are 
impermissible, while it is permissible.23 
Even granting this non-maximizing conception of rationality, this leaves out an important 
element for a normative theory, namely an account of what you ought to do. Though what you 
ought to do is not always properly distinguished from what you are required to do in moral 
philosophy, these are two importantly distinct overall normative statuses. What you are 
required to do is plausibly very closely tied to what you can be criticized for not doing. But 
what you ought to do is not necessarily tied to criticism in this way.24 Think of the way we 
might describe the normative status of some supererogatory action: “You really ought to help 
out, though of course you don’t have to”. On some demanding moral theories, there may not 
be a substantive distinction between what you ought to do and what you are required to do, 
but I think it is clear that there is at least a conceptual distinction.25 
The criticism-based view has trouble accounting for what you ought to do, in this sense.26 This 
is because ought is closely connected to what’s best, in the sense of being the most strongly 
supported by reasons.27 ‘Best’ and ‘most’ are comparative terms: you ought to do something 
when it’s better or more strongly supported by reasons than the alternatives. The account of the 
competition between reasons sketched so far on behalf of the criticism-based view is focused 
on the competition between the reasons for an option and the reasons against it. We don’t yet 
have any way of comparing different alternatives in terms of how well supported they are by 
the reasons.28 																																																								
23 This last clause is important if we accept the possibility of dilemmas, in which all of our options are 
impermissible and none are required. 
24 Perhaps some sort of criticism is appropriate in some cases in which you don’t do what you ought to 
do, even if you aren’t required to do it; see, e.g., Driver (1992), Macnamara (2013). But the criticism will 
at least typically be weaker and not call for apologies, reparations, punishment, etc. 
25 For a sampling of work on this issue, see McNamara (1996a, b), Bedke (2011), Snedegar (2016). 
26 Bedke (2011) also argues that Gert’s view fails to explain ought as opposed to requirement, though in 
a different way. See also Snedegar (2016). 
27 For early work on the connection between ‘ought’ and ‘best’, see Sloman (1970). Finlay (2010, 2014) 
also emphasizes the connection between ‘ought’ and ‘best’. 
28 Perhaps using ‘ought’ to describe the best action is sometimes too strong, or at least can sound wrong, 
for example when the best action is only best by some trivial amount. The objection to the criticism-
based view is essentially just that it leaves us no way to make comparisons between the options in terms 
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The balance account focuses on the competition between reasons for competing options, but 
does not have a natural way to account for the competition between reasons for an option and 
reasons against it. The criticism-based account focuses on the latter kind of competition, but 
does not have a natural way to account for the former. The latter’s trouble accounting for what 
we ought to do, as opposed to what we’re required to do, is a symptom of this problem. 
Suppose that reasons for one option are also reasons against alternatives, even if we don’t 
identify reasons against with reasons for alternatives. Then we have some sort of relationship 
between the reasons bearing on different alternatives. But even if this is true, such that reasons 
for alternatives to an option are factored into the competition between reasons for that option 
and reasons against it, this still doesn’t yet solve the main issue raised above. The problem is 
to explain how to compare competing alternatives in terms of how well they are supported by 
the reasons. Without this, we won’t be able to explain how your reasons determine what you 
ought to do, in addition to what you must and may do. The reasons bearing on alternatives get 
factored into the competition between reasons for and reasons against a given option; but the 
outcome of this competition determines what you must or may do. So we still don’t have an 
answer to the question of how your reasons determine what you ought to do. In the next 
section I sketch a positive account that draws on aspects of both the balance account and the 
criticism-based account, and argue that it gives us a more complete picture of how the 
competition between reasons determines the overall normative status of our options. But I’ll 
also show that open questions and problems remain. 
5 Toward a Positive Account 
To sum up and simplify a bit, criticism-based accounts recognize the importance of considering 
the reasons against an option in determining its overall normative status, but do not seem to 
accommodate the importance of comparing the option to its alternatives. Balancing accounts, 
on the other hand, focus on comparisons between alternatives, but do not have a natural way 
of accommodating the importance of reasons against options. If reasons against an option were 
simply reasons for alternatives, then each kind of account may avoid these problems. But as 
I’ve argued, reasons against cannot be reduced to or identified with reasons for alternatives. In 
this section, I sketch a view that explicitly recognizes the two different kinds of competition 
between reasons—the two different kinds of rebutting defeat—that I’ve focused on in this 
paper. The view does not require that the two kinds of competition are radically distinct, such 
that what it is for a reason for A to compete with a reason for B is very different, 
metaphysically speaking, from what it is for a reason for A to compete with a reason against A. 
In sketching the account, I understand both kinds of competition as involving the weights of 
the reasons involved. Rather, the difference is in the normative relevance, in terms of what you 
ought to, must, or may do, of the outcomes of the two different kinds of competition. It may be 																																																																																																																																																																																		
of how strongly supported those options are. Focusing on the overall status expressed by ‘ought’ is a 
natural way to bring this out. Thanks to Kurt Sylvan here. 
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that for the outcomes of the competitions to play these roles, the two kinds of competition 
must differ in some deep way, but I leave that question aside. 
The view incorporates elements from both criticism-based accounts and balancing accounts. I’ll 
explain the role of each kind of competition in determining the overall normative status of the 
options. Along the way I will flag some important questions and choice points; settling these 
will require further work, which will sometimes involve doing substantive normative theory. 
The proposal here is not radically new. I suspect it is largely just a way of spelling out an 
orthodox way of thinking about the competition between reasons.29 What is important is (i) 
the distinction between the two different kinds of competition between reasons, and 
correspondingly, (ii) the different roles these competitions have in determining overall 
normative status. 
The discussion will be idealized in familiar ways by assuming that we can perform something 
like mathematical functions on and make mathematical comparisons of the weights of reasons 
and sets of reasons. I assume (i) that we can compare the weights of reasons and sets of 
reasons using something like the greater than (>), lesser than (<), and equal to (=) relations, 
(ii) that we can make sense of the combined weight of reasons (e.g., R1 and R2, taken together, 
support the option to a certain degree) and the difference in weights of reasons (e.g., R1 is 
weightier than R2 by a certain degree), and (iii) that we can make sense of the overall weight of 
the reasons bearing on an option being positive or negative—that is, that the reasons, taken 
together, either support the option or count against it. Importantly, (ii) is not to assume that 
the weights of reasons combine in a purely additive way, such that if R1 and R2 are the only 
reasons for A, then the combined weight of the reasons for A is simply the weight of R1 plus 
the weight of R2, or that if R3 is a reason for A and R4 is a reason against A, and these are the 
only reasons in play, then the overall weight of reasons for A is simply the weight of R3 minus 
the weight of R4. Nevertheless, for convenience I will use ‘+’ for the combining weights 
operation and ‘−’ for the difference in weights operation. Issues involving the more 
complicated ways that reasons actually seem to combine and weigh against each other will 
have to be left aside here.30 
The first kind of competition is that between reasons for an option and reasons against it. 
What we need for this is the combined weight of all the reasons for 𝐴, 𝑊(𝑅𝐹2), and the 
combined weight of all the reasons against 𝐴, 𝑊(𝑅𝐴2). Then we find the difference in these 
weights: 𝑊(𝑅𝐹2) −𝑊(𝑅𝐴2) = 𝑊(𝑅2), which gives us the degree of overall reason for an option. 
As a first pass at how the competition between reasons for and reasons against determines the 
overall normative status of an option, I propose the following. If 𝑊(𝑅2) is positive (i.e., if 𝑊(𝑅𝐹2) > 𝑊(𝑅𝐴2)), then 𝐴 is permissible. If 𝑊(𝑅2) is negative (i.e., if 𝑊(𝑅𝐹2) < 𝑊(𝑅𝐴2)), 																																																								
29 Compare the generalized weighing framework in Berker (2007), especially pp. 113-114. 
30 For work on related issues, see Dancy (2004), especially Chapter 3, Bader (2016), Nair (2016), Sher 
(2019), Maguire (2016), Maguire and Snedegar (ms). 
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then 𝐴 is impermissible.31 This leaves cases in which the reasons for and reasons against an 
option are balanced. I am inclined to think that such options are permissible, to accommodate 
the thought that when there’s no reason at all either for or against 𝐴, 𝐴 is permissible, but 
there are likely interesting questions here (compare: “There was no reason to do that!” as a 
criticism, vs. “There was no reason not to!” as a defense). So provisionally, we can say that 
when 𝑊(𝑅𝐹2) ≥ 𝑊(𝑅𝐴2), 𝐴 is permissible. 
This takes from the criticism-based approach the idea that the reasons against an option are 
particularly relevant in determining whether it is permissible. They tend to rule out performing 
the option, and unless there are sufficiently strong reasons in favor, the option will be 
impermissible. Thinking of the reasons against an option as criticisms of it makes this 
particularly clear: if there are criticisms of some option that cannot be answered or 
compensated for, then it is plausible that the option is impermissible. 
As stated so far, though, this account of permissibility faces a problem.32 We can see this by 
looking at the case I used above to criticize balance accounts. You can press either button 1 or 
button 2. Pressing either button will get you a particular $100 bill, but pressing 2 will also 
deliver a mild electric shock. You would be willing to endure this shock to get $100, so it 
seems that the reason for pressing 2, that it will get you the $100 bill, is weightier than the 
reason against, that you will be shocked. So according to the account above, pressing button 2 
is permissible. But this is incorrect: pressing button 2 in this case would be foolish. 
I have tried to explain permissibility (and, shortly, requirement) just in terms of the reasons 
for and against the particular option, whereas what you ought to do will be explained in terms 
of comparisons among the alternatives. But the lesson of this case is that even for 
permissibility and requirement, the alternatives matter: it is only because of the availability of 
pressing button 1 that pressing button 2 is impermissible. The task for now is to say exactly 
how it is that the alternatives matter for permissibility and requirement. 
One way in which the alternatives can matter is by the reasons bearing on those alternatives 
transmitting to the option in question. In my view, sometimes reasons for one alternative are 
also reasons against incompatible alternatives. This is one way to explain the notion of an 
opportunity cost: among the costs of an option are the good features of the alternatives that 
you’ll miss out on. This is consistent with denying that all reasons against options are nothing 
over and above reasons for alternatives. But in this case, given that you will get the $100 either 
way, I don’t think it is plausible that the reason for pressing button 1—that it will get you 
$100—is a reason against pressing button 2.  
Rather, I think that in cases like this, the alternatives matter by helping to determine which 
considerations are or are not reasons for the option in question. In particular, since you will get 																																																								
31 Compare Sher (fc), p. 2. 
32 Thanks to Jonathan Way here. 
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the $100 either way, I hold that the fact that you’ll get the $100 by pressing button 2 is not a 
reason for pressing button 2. Hence, there is only a reason against pressing button 2 (the 
shock), and so it is impermissible.  
The surprising consequence of this view is that there the $100 also does not give you reason to 
press button 1. So if the money and the shock are the only relevant considerations, there won’t 
be any reason to press button 1. Nevertheless, pressing button 1 will be permissible, since 
there’s at least as much reason for it as against it (namely, no reason either way). In fact it will 
be required, since the only alternative is impermissible.33 Though it may seem initially 
surprising to deny that the fact that you can get $100 by pressing button 1 (or button 2, for 
that matter) is a reason for pressing button 1, I think this is plausible. The crucial point is that 
you’ll get the $100 no matter what you do (assuming pressing 1 and pressing 2 are the only 
options). So you cannot, for example, justify yourself in pressing button 1 (instead of button 2) 
by pointing out that you’ll get $100. Also, it would be odd to base your decision to press 
button 1 (instead of button 2) on the fact that you will get $100 by pressing button 1. Being 
able to serve as justifiers or at least sensible bases for decision are commonly thought to be 
earmarks, if not conceptual requirements, for some consideration’s being a reason.34 So it 
should not seem so surprising that in this case, that you can get $100 by pressing button 1 will 
not be a reason to press button 1, since you’ll get the $100 no matter what you do.  
If this kind of solution is on the right track, and can be generalized, then we have the start of 
an account that tells us when an option is permissible in terms of the reasons for and against 
it. We also get an account of when an option is required: an option is required when all of the 
other options are impermissible—that is, when the reasons against each of the other options 
outweigh the reasons for them. If more than one option is permissible, then no single option is 
required.35 There are clear similarities between this understanding of permissibility and 
requirement and the one we get from the criticism-based account.  
																																																								
33 In fact things will be a bit trickier since it seems that we can make true reasons ascriptions like, “That 
you will get shocked by pressing button 2 is a reason to press button 1, instead”. I think that this is true, 
but that the reason ascribed is a derivative reason—derivative on the reason against pressing 2. A full 
theory here will need to explain when we get these derivative reasons and how their weights do or do 
not contribute to the overall status of the options in question. It would seem to be a mistake, for 
example, to treat this derivative reason for pressing button 1 as having weight that is independent of and 
in addition to the weight of the reason against pressing button 2 on which it is derivative.  
34 See, e.g., Schroeder (2007), Chapter 2, Setiya (2014), Gregory (2016), Silverstein (2016), Way (2017), 
and Snedegar (2019).  
35 An open question at this point is whether it is possible for the reasons against to win out for every 
option, making every option impermissible. Many people think that such tragic dilemmas are 
impossible. We could, for example, argue that the fact that an option is the “least bad” is always a 
decisive reason to do it.  
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But as I argued in the previous section, this leaves out an important part of the normative 
domain—namely, what we ought to do, as opposed to what we’re required to do. To quickly 
review the main points from the previous section: we ought to do is very plausibly what’s best, 
in some sense.36 But to say that some option is the best is to say that it’s better than the 
alternatives. So to account for what we ought to do, we need to introduce a comparison among 
the alternatives.  
The overall weight of the reasons bearing on an option, 𝐴, which I called 𝑊(𝑅2), is determined 
by the difference between the weight of the set of reasons for 𝐴 and the set of reasons against 𝐴. So we can compare these weights of overall reason for each of the options. What we ought 
to do is the option that ranks at the top of this comparison: you ought to do 𝐴 when 𝑊(𝑅2) >𝑊(𝑅5), for all the alternatives, 𝐵. Whereas the competition between reasons for an option and 
reasons against that option are most directly relevant for determining which options are 
permissible and required, the competition between the reasons bearing on competing 
alternatives is most directly relevant for determining what you ought to do.37 
This picture has some attractive features. First, it explains important overall or verdictive 
normative statuses—permissibility, impermissibility, requirement, and ought—in terms of pro 
tanto reasons. This is a popular and attractive idea, but it has proved challenging to provide 
satisfactory accounts of all of these notions in terms of reasons.38 Second, the picture captures 
the correct logical relationships between permissibility, requirement, and ought. To focus on 
the relationship between requirement and ought: if some option 𝐴 is required, then it is also 
what you ought to do. Since 𝐴 is required, the reasons against each alternative 𝐵 outweigh the 
reasons for 𝐵; thus 𝑊(𝑅5) will be negative for all the alternatives, 𝐵. Moreover, since 𝐴 is 
required, it is either the only permissible option, in which case it is the only option for which 𝑊(𝑅2) is positive. So 𝑊(𝑅2) > 𝑊(𝑅5) for each alternative 𝐵, and thus 𝐴 is what you ought to 
do. But 𝐴 might be what you ought to do without being required, since it is compatible with 𝑊(𝑅2) > 𝑊(𝑅5) that 𝑊(𝑅5) is nevertheless positive—that is, 𝐵 is permissible. This is just 
what we want, because it has been widely noted in both linguistics and philosophy (the former 
focusing on the modals that express these normative statuses and the latter focusing on the 
																																																								
36 Cf. Sloman (1970), Finlay (2010), von Fintel and Iatridou (2008). 
37 As noted in the introduction, I am focusing on the moral case. In the epistemic domain, it is much less 
clear that there is a substantial difference between ought and requirement. One possible explanation for 
this, which I cannot explore at any length here, is that in the epistemic domain, unlike in the moral 
domain, reasons for believing p, or evidence for p, are always reasons against believing, or evidence 
against, propositions that are incompatible with p. If so, then it would plausibly turn out that any time 
the reasons for believing p outweighed the reasons against believing p, the reasons against believing any 
incompatible alternative q would outweigh the reasons for believing q.  
38 See Snedegar (2016) for arguments against some recent attempts, including Bedke (2011). 
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statuses themselves) that there is a one-way entailment from requirement to ought.39 This 
captures the commonsense idea that there are things that you really ought to do, though you 
are not required to do so, and are not acting impermissibly if you don’t—think of paradigm 
cases of supererogation, for example. 
This is just a sketch, and open questions remain, but I do think it gives us the beginnings of an 
attractive account. As I noted above, I don’t take this view to be any radical departure from an 
orthodox way of thinking about how reasons compete. Rather, what is important about it is 
the incorporation of the two different kinds of competition between reasons. Both the standard 
balance account and the criticism-based account are incomplete because they focus on just one 
kind of competition. 
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